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Developing Countries
Background and Introduction
When the WTO came into existence formally as an institution in 1995, 1  it was a 
culmination of the process to institutionalize the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) which had been in operation since 1947. As an institution with Membership of 
149 countries, the goal of the WTO is to facilitate the implementation, administration, 
and operation of the Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs); to provide a forum for 
negotiations among Member States; to administer the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, amongst others.2
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU) of the WTO has been touted as one of the biggest achievements of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations.3 Its aim is to provide security and predictability to the 
1 The WTO was established by the “Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation” signed on the 15th of April 1994 (hereinafter “Marrakesh 
Agreement”), which was a culmination of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. 
There had been 7 other rounds of trade negotiations before this, all under the General 
Agreement on Trade & Tariffs (GATT)1947- see Raj Bhala & Kevin Kennedy World 
Trade Law (1998) 5. The GATT 1947 was just a set of rules to facilitate trade 
negotiations leading to tariff reductions. It was not a formal institution. The advent of the 
WTO in 1995 changed all that and the GATT 1947 is subsumed under GATT 1994 
comprising GATT 1947, several protocols & decisions, and several Understandings. In 
this paper, GATT 1994 refers to the text of the GATT 1947. See generally GATT 
Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The 
Legal Texts (Geneva 1994) (hereafter ‘WTO Legal Text’).
2 Art 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement deals with the functions of the WTO.
3 Quoting Dewey Ballantine LLP from “Comments Concerning Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the World Trade Organization”, June 25 1998, available on 
<http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/wto_comments.pdf> (accessed on April 24 2006):
“The United States identified the DSU as the cornerstone accomplishment of the Uruguay Round. In their 
testimony to Congress, Ambassadors Kantor and Yerxa both repeatedly counted the new DSU among the 
“most important changes” made by the Uruguay Round. See, e.g., GATT Trade Agreements):Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. (January 26, 1994) (statement of Mickey 
Kantor, United States Trade Representative).  Jeffrey E. Garten, Under Secretary of Commerce, hailed the
improved dispute settlement mechanism as “our most important achievement.” Similarly, in the chairman’s 
statement from the May 5, 1995 Quad Ministerial, the DSU was described as ‘one of the crowning 
2multilateral trading system. 4  The DSU recognizes that “[t]he prompt settlement of 
situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under the covered agreements 5  are being impaired by measures taken by 
another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance 
of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members”.6 Thus, in a situation 
where one Member State is aggrieved by the illegal action of another, it can bring the 
dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)7 and avail itself of the range of 
available remedies. Allowing Member States to unilaterally decide that there has been a 
violation and to choose their remedies will only lead to chaos; therefore to a large extent, 
remedies are regulated by the DSB. Article 23:2 of the DSU specifically provides that; 
“…Members shall (a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has 
occurred…except through recourse to dispute settlement…”  They are therefore bound to, 
“(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of 
concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those 
procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations…”.8
Article 3:7 of the DSU lists the alternative dispute settlement remedies. It provides that;
… [a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent 
with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a 
achievements of the Uruguay Round.’ (“‘Quad’ ministers urge better service, investment rules,” Japan 
Economic Newswire May 6, 1995).”
4 Art 3:2 DSU, available in the WTO Legal Text. 
5 The ‘covered agreements’ are the annexes to the Marrakesh Agreement. Annex1A 
is a compendium of the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods (this covers 13 
independent agreements), Annex 1B is the General Agreement on Trade in Services and 
Annexes, while Annex 1C is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights.
6 Article 3:3 DSU, WTO Legal Text.
7 According to Art 2:1 DSU, the Dispute Settlement Body is established to 
administer the rules and procedures under the DSU, as well as the consultation and 
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements. It has the authority to establish 
panels, adopt panel and appellate body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation 
of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other 
obligations under the covered agreements.
8 Art 23:2 (c) DSU, WTO Legal Text.
3mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if 
these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered 
agreements.  The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the 
immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary 
measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a 
covered agreement.  The last resort which this Understanding provides to 
the Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of 
suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under the 
covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the other Member, 
subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures.9
With all these remedies in place, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is actively 
being used in the resolution of disputes among WTO Members. Despite this however, 
cases generally revolve around ‘the usual suspects’ i.e. the countries that have been 
making the most use of dispute settlement procedures under the WTO (e.g. the United 
States, the European Communities, Canada, and Brazil).10 It is a fact that the smaller 
developing countries have been sorely lacking in the WTO dispute settlement 
procedure.11,12
9 Emphasis mine.
10 United States has been a complainant in 81 cases, the EC in 70 cases, Canada in 
26 cases, and Brazil in 22 cases. 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (accessed on 
March 23 2006).
11 Taking a look at the list of respondents and complainants from the WTO website-
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm>, and comparing 
against the list of LDCs on the UN website- <http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm>, Bangladesh is the first and only LDC that has ever brought a 
complaint before the DSB; See India- Antidumping Measure on Batteries from 
Bangladesh (WT/DS306). The dispute was in relation to certain anti-dumping measures 
imposed by India on imports of lead acid batteries from Bangladesh. A request for 
consultations was brought by Bangladesh on January 28 2004. By February 20 2006, the 
parties informed the DSB of a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter: India had 
terminated the measure in contention in January 2005.
12 Egypt and South Africa are the only two African countries to feature as main 
parties in WTO dispute settlement and in both cases, they have been respondents- Egypt 
4Various reasons have been cited for poor developing country participation in WTO 
dispute settlement.13 Bown & Hoekman adduce several reasons why there is little or no 
dispute settlement activity by developing countries. 14 First, on the import side, potential 
developing country complainants are typically small consumers that are unable to affect 
world prices. This means that under the current “retaliation-as-compensation” approach, 
these countries will lack the capacity to impose the large political-economic welfare 
losses on potential respondent countries that would generate the internal political pressure 
in those countries that may be a necessary element to induce compliance with adverse 
DSU rulings. One other fear which is shared by developing countries is the fear of 
political ramifications should they engage a bigger country in dispute settlement. Many 
poor developing countries rely on aid from the richer countries, and so would want to 
avoid counter-retaliation that might affect the aid they are receiving, or disrupt existing 
preferential trading arrangements, if not within the WTO then elsewhere. 15 Human 
resource constraint is also one of the reasons for developing country absence from 
dispute settlement. In a luncheon organized by the German Marshall Fund with the theme 
“Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement: A Changing Relationship”, the 
speakers from the developing countries cited ‘lack of domestic capacity and legal 
on four occasions and South Africa on 2 occasions. See 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (accessed on 
March 23 2006)
13 Petina Gappah, “African Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 
available on 
<http://www.tralac.org/pdf/African_Countries_and_the_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_Syst
em.rtf>; Chad P. Bown “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, 
Interested Parties, and Free Riders” available at 
<http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/free_ride.pdf > (accessed on March 22, 
2006).
14 Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, “WTO Dispute Settlement and the 
Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector” (2005) 8 Journal of 
International Economic Law JIEL 861-890, available at 
<jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/4/861>.
15 See Joost Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are 
Rules- Toward a More Collective Approach”, (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law AJIL 335 at 338. 
5sophistication’ as reasons why developing countries have not been making use of WTO 
dispute settlement. 16
This paper argues that one of the reasons why more use is not being made of the dispute 
settlement process by developing countries is the inadequacy of the existing remedies, for 
their peculiar situation. The existing dispute settlement remedies are: withdrawal of the 
offending measure, compensation, and suspension of equivalent concessions i.e. 
retaliation. 17  But it has been found that these remedies do not always meet the 
expectations of Members. The violating Member will not always remove the violation; 
Compensation is hardly ever agreed on; and Retaliation is at odds with the trade 
liberalization goal of the WTO and hardly benefits either party anyway. Consequently, 
there is an urgent need to review the existing remedies with a view to finding alternative 
remedies, particularly for developing countries. This paper is proposing monetary 
compensation as an alternative dispute settlement remedy.  With the current negotiations 
going on as part of the Doha Round,18  the appropriate forum is available for these 
discussions to take place.
Part one discusses all the available WTO trade remedies according to their uses. Part two 
takes a look at the problems with the existing remedies. Part three introduces financial 
compensation as an alternative dispute settlement remedy for developing countries. Part 
four focuses on the key elements to be taken into consideration in negotiating financial 
compensation as a dispute settlement. Part five will discuss the arguments for and against 
this proposal. The final part summarises the discussion and looks into some 
16 The German Marshall Fund Trade & Development Speaker Series: Developing 
Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement held on April 20 2005 in Washington DC, report 
available on http://www.gmfus.org/trade/event/detail.cfm?id=70&parent_type=E
(accessed on April 20 2006).
17 These are provided for in Article 3:7 of the DSU and are discussed more in-depth 
in Part 1 of this paper.
18 The Doha Round of Negotiations was launched in November 2001 by a 
Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN01/DEC/1) adopted on November 14 2001. Tagged the 
‘Doha Development Agenda’, it has at its heart, the needs and interests of developing 
country Members of the WTO.
6recommendations for attaining financial compensation as an alternative dispute 
settlement remedy.
1 Available Remedies under the WTO
The WTO is a rules-based and Member-driven organisation. By this, it means that WTO 
Members make rules that guide their general conduct and expect these to be followed. 
The WTO Agreements have made provision for various remedies to be employed under 
different circumstances where these rules are breached. Since this paper proposes an 
additional remedy to those which are already available, I would start by going through all 
the existing remedies under the WTO, their applicability, as well as the mechanisms for 
their implementation. 
Remedies in the WTO are of two kinds. There are the ‘trade remedies’ which are distinct 
from ‘dispute settlement remedies’. The trade remedies are the antidumping duty, the 
countervailing duty, and safeguard actions. In the GATT 1994, Articles VI, XVI and XIX 
make provision for these remedies to be available to WTO Members in certain situations. 
These GATT provisions have all been subsequently expanded by other independent 
Agreements which flesh out the provisions of those articles. These are dealt with in turn.
1.1 Trade Remedies
These are remedies which a WTO Member may avail itself of without recourse to dispute 
settlement. These remedies provide Members with a fast and efficient means of dealing 
with certain breaches of WTO obligations. While they are fast and effective in most 
instances, by their nature, they do not and cannot solve most of the violations that occur. 
1.1.1 Anti- dumping Duty
One of the WTO rules is that products from a Member are not to be ‘dumped’ unto the 
market of another in such a way as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry 
producing a like product, of the importing Member. Article VI GATT 1947 is the original 
provision dealing with this situation. However, in 1979, the Tokyo Round Antidumping 
Code was developed as a supplement to Article VI of the GATT; and now post- Uruguay 
7Round we have the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI GATT (Anti-
Dumping Agreement). 
A product is to be considered as being ‘dumped’, i.e. introduced into the commerce of 
another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported 
from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of 
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.19
Dumping is a form of unfair competition. In order to offset its harmful effects, a 
contracting party may remedy the situation by levying on any dumped product, an 
antidumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such 
product. The margin of dumping is arrived at by the difference between the normal value
(the price of the imported product in the “ordinary course of trade” in the country of 
origin or export) and export price (the price of the product in the country of import)
1.1.2 Countervailing Duty
According to Article XVI of the GATT 1994, a subsidy occurs where there is any form of 
income or price support which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any 
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into the territory of a country. This 
definition of subsidy covers both export subsidies and domestic support. Subsidies are 
generally a breach of WTO rules. The only acceptable subsidies are those which have 
little or no distorting activity e.g. research grants, grants to fund disadvantaged regions 
within a Member State, and assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities.20
Export subsidies are expressly prohibited21, while domestic support is actionable if it 
causes serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.22
19 Art 2:1 Agreement on Implementation of Art VI GATT (hereafter ‘Antidumping 
Agreement’), WTO Legal Text.
20 Art. 8 Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures (hereafter ‘SCM 
Agreement’), WTO Legal Text.
21 See generally Article XVI GATT 1994; Article 3 SCM Agreement.
22 Article5 SCM Agreement.
8Different remedies are available depending on the subsidy in question and its effect. For 
instance, in a situation where the subsidy is causing an injury to the domestic industry 
and is such that can be remedied by imposing a duty, the affected country has to carry out 
an investigation to establish a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged 
injury. On conclusion of the investigation, a duty (countervailing duty) to offset the effect 
of the subsidy will be imposed until the removal of the subsidy. However in a situation 
where the subsidy is entirely prohibited, a Member cannot impose a duty, rather it must 
seek consultation and if this fails, request a Panel to decide the dispute.23
The purpose of the countervailing duty is to protect the domestic industry from the effect 
of imported goods which come in cheap by virtue of the fact that they are being 
subsidized. While this may protect the local industry of the importing country, it does 
nothing to aid in their competitiveness in the world market. They would still lose their 
share of trade in the international market as a result of the subsidy. For instance in the 
US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute,24 if the West African countries had decided to 
investigate the alleged subsidy provided to US cotton producers and had imposed a duty 
accordingly, this would only aid the cotton producers within their respective countries. 
But in the world market, the countervailing duty would have no effect as the US cotton 
would be cheaper thereby creating less demand for the unsubsidized and therefore more 
expensive cotton from the African countries.
1.1.3 Safeguards
The third trade remedy is the use of safeguards. Unlike other WTO remedies, there need 
not be a breach of a WTO obligation before a Member can make use of a safeguard 
remedy. Known as “emergency action on imports of particular products”,25 a Member 
may suspend or withdraw its WTO obligations (e.g. by imposing quantitative restrictions, 
or increasing tariffs) where a product is being imported into its territory in such quantity 
as to cause or threaten serious injury to its domestic market. This is an emergency action 
23 Art 4 SCM Agreement.
24 Discussed in greater detail later in the paper.
25 Art XIX GATT 1994.
9which should be in use only as a temporary measure; and the Member applying the 
measure is expected to consult with the affected Member before taking action. The 
Agreement on Safeguards goes further to develop Article XIX of the GATT by making 
provisions for investigation, 26  the determination of serious injury, 27  application of 
safeguard measures, 28  and the duration of the measures. 29 In addition, a Member 
proposing to apply a safeguard measure shall endeavour to maintain a substantially 
equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to that existing under GATT 1994 
between it and the exporting Member(s) which would be affected by such a measure.30
Even though this has the potential for being a great temporary remedy, it should be 
remembered that safeguard measures designed to be used where there is a breach of 
WTO obligations. Thus, as a remedy it is not useful where there has been an actual 
violation of WTO obligations, making it a very limited remedy. It must be noted that 
before any of the above remedies can be imposed, a thorough investigation must be 
carried out. Failure to do this could result in a challenge of the actions through the dispute 
settlement mechanism, particularly with respect to antidumping duty and countervailing 
duty, so Members must be careful when carrying out their investigations.31
The above is a brief description of the WTO provisions for trade remedies. However, 
some remedies are only available where they have been sanctioned by the Dispute 
Settlement Body. These are examined in detail below.
1.2 Dispute Settlement Remedies
According to Article 3:7 of the DSU, where a matter has been successfully brought 
before the DSB, the recommended remedies are the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered 
26 Art 3 Agreement on Safeguards.
27 Id Art 4.
28 Id Art 5.
29 Id Art 7.
30 Id Art 8.
31 Art 17 Antidumping Agreement; Article 30 SCM Agreement.
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agreements, the provision of compensation, and suspending the application of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
The prescribed remedy at the determination of any dispute is the withdrawal of the 
offensive measure. This is the preferred solution to all disputes. The Member who is 
found in breach is given “a reasonable period of time” to withdraw the measure.32 So far, 
compliance with DSB recommendations has been very good. In a study done by Davey, 
there has been a successful rate of implementation of Panel/ Appellate Body reports of 
about 83%.33
Where a Member refuses or is unable to remove the measure within the time prescribed, 
then the next best alternative is for the parties involved to negotiate compensation. 
Usually this takes the form of improved market access through increased concessions. If 
for instance country A is to withdraw a restriction on beef imports from another country, 
it may provide trade concessions to the tune of $x ($x is the value of nullification and 
impairment suffered by the complainant) to the affected Member basically by reducing 
the tariffs on other products of interest to the winning Member.
The final alternative, one which is not usually encouraged is the suspension of equivalent 
concessions, more commonly referred to as ‘retaliation’. In this instance, after the other 
two remedies have failed, then the winning Member may bring an application to suspend 
equivalent concessions i.e. retaliate. Application for an authorization to retaliate has to be 
decided by arbitration pursuant to Article 22.2 DSU. One prominent case in which this 
32 Art 21:3 DSU. A reasonable period of time is not defined; but see United States-
Reformulated Gasoline Status Report by the United States (WT/DS2/10) where a 
reasonable period of time was decided to be 15 months; United States- Measures 
Affecting The Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services Award of the 
Arbitrator (WT/DS285/13) where a reasonable amount of time was eleven months and 2 
weeks.
33 William J. Davey, “The WTO Dispute Settlement: How Have Developing 
Countries Fared?” Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series 
Research Paper No. 05-17, (November 30 2005) available on < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=862804> (accessed on February 16, 
2006).
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happened is the EC- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) where 
the United States requested authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the 
European Communities and its Member States thereof, of tariff concessions and related 
obligations under the GATT 1994.34
2  The Problem with WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies
In order to preserve the goodwill among Member States, the first option in any dispute 
settlement procedure is always a request for consultations by the complaining Member. 
The consultation is in a bid to settle the dispute amicably without the rancour associated 
with formal dispute settlement. It is only when this fails that a Member may request for 
the establishment of a Panel with defined terms of reference.
The Panel comes to a decision based on the submission of both parties and where a 
violation is found, the recommended remedy is withdrawal of the violation. It is only 
when this is not done that the other remedies become available. Admittedly, there is 
usually no need to look beyond a withdrawal of the violation; most countries are willing 
to allow the dispute settlement process to be effective, and so they comply with the 
rulings of the DSB.35 But this is not always the case. As an example of delay or non-
compliance with Panel/ Appellate Body reports, the United States- Measures Affecting 
the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services case between the United 
States and Antigua & Barbuda comes to mind.36 The set deadline for the United States to 
34 Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 DSU (WT/DS26/19).
35 DG Supachai Panitchpakdi on March 11 2005 in a speech marking 10 years of the 
WTO stated as follows, “This system [dispute settlement] has largely been successful 
because WTO member governments have been prepared to implement Panel and 
Appellate Body rulings and to bring their laws and regulations into conformity with 
WTO rules should a Panel decision go against them”,. The full text of the speech is 
available on <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp35_e.htm> (accessed on 
April 24 2006).
36 Antigua & Barbuda had requested a Panel on June 12 2003 to protest the action of 
United States authorities which affected the cross-border supply of gambling and betting 
services contrary to the schedule of commitments under GATS. It was decided by the 
Panel and upheld by the Appellate Body that the United States measures were 
inconsistent with its GATS obligations and that it had breached its National Treatment 
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comply was April 3, 2006. The deadline passed without the United States complying with 
the ruling.37 What kind of action Antigua & Barbuda will take remains to be seen. 
Even where there is some semblance of compliance, the question is to what extent there 
is compliance. There is usually a need for compliance-monitoring, for which there is no 
formal WTO apparatus. 38  It is therefore left to the winning party to monitor the 
compliance. It is not always to be taken for granted that a losing party will implement a 
ruling to the full extent possible. Therefore, it falls on the winning party to follow the 
measures taken by the losing party in order to ensure that the ruling is adequately 
followed. This is usually a time and resource consuming responsibility. Where it is a 
developing country that has just won a challenge, it will definitely be more difficult for it 
to monitor compliance.  Besides, even where there is full compliance, this does not 
remedy the harm that had already been done. 
Where there is no removal of the offensive measure then there comes a need for an 
alternative remedy. According to Article 22:1 DSU, “[c]ompensation…is a temporary 
measure available in the event that recommendations and rulings are not implemented 
within a reasonable period of time….[c]ompensation is voluntary and if granted shall be 
consistent with the covered agreements.” Compensation in WTO parlance does not mean 
monetary damages the way it is understood in most legal systems. Instead, compensation 
is taken to mean that the losing party grants increased concessions i.e. increased market 
access to the winning party. The increased market access does not have to be in the same 
sector as that leading to the dispute.39
obligation. Through arbitration it was decided that the deadline for compliance was April 
3 2006. See the Appellate Body Report at WT/DS285/AB/R.
37 The United States has not started the process of amending the necessary 
legislation, and at this time the deadline is past with still no action by the United States. 
In a status report (WT/DS285/15/Ad1) circulated by the United States delegation to the 
Chairman of the DSB dated April 11 2006, the United States claimed that it is in 
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB because its existing 
criminal statutes prohibit interstate transmission of gambling. 
38 This is regardless of Art 21:6 of the DSU that says the DSB is to keep under 
surveillance the implementation of the ruling.
39 Art 22:3 of the DSU. 
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Compensation is the least used WTO trade remedy to date.40  There is only one reported 
case of compensation post-dispute settlement.41 There are several possible explanations 
for this. One of the main problems with compensation is that it is voluntary. What this 
means is that it is up to the losing party to offer compensation which is acceptable to the 
winner. A Member that has refused to remove the inconsistent measure could dig in its 
heels and offer terms which are obviously unacceptable to the winning party. Again, by 
the provisions of Article 22, compensation is to be “consistent with the covered 
agreements”. WTO negotiating history shows that WTO pillars like the Most Favoured 
Nation Treatment (MFN) must be followed in the application of compensatory 
measures.42 In other words, where a party goes through the entire process of securing a 
positive ruling from the DSB, the remedy which it receives from the process is to be 
enjoyed by all the Members of the WTO. This reeks of unfairness and is probably one of 
the more compelling reasons why compensation is not usually resorted to. It is unusual 
that a party would not mind going through the entire dispute settlement process and then 
have to share its spoils with every other Member.
Apart from the fact that the MFN principle 43  has to be followed in providing 
compensation, the DSU has another provision that makes it obligatory to make the 
measures resulting from negotiations on compensation generally applicable. Article 3:5
DSU states that “… [a]ll solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and 
40 A look at the list of all WTO cases and their status reflects this. See 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#top> 
(accessed on March 23 2006).
41 It was in Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS8/AB/R; 
WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R) that compensation was used for the first time in 
WTO dispute settlement. As compensation for the delay in implementing the 
recommendation of the DSB, Japan agreed with the United States to apply reduced tariff 
rates and in some cases zero tariffs on specific items. Subsequently, similar agreements 
were reached with the European Communities and Canada to receive at least comparable 
tariff concessions as that granted to the United States.
42 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement- Dispute Settlement Proposal MTN.GNG/NG13/W/30 
10 October 1988: “Where applied, compensation shall be on a most-favoured nation basis and shall be 
aimed at the restoration of the proper balance between the rights and obligations of all Contracting Parties”.
43 See infra note 115.
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dispute settlement  provisions… shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any 
Member under those agreements…”. Giving increased concessions to one Member even 
though compensatory, nullifies benefits to the other Members. ‘Nullification’ according 
to GATT Article XXIII occurs in any of the following situations:
• The failure of a contracting party to carry out its obligations,
• The application by any other contracting party of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of the Agreement, and
• The existence of any other situation.
Providing compensatory trade concessions to one country without extending same to 
other Members could be argued to be a nullification of the benefits accruing to other 
Members, even though the measure is not contrary to any provision of the covered 
agreements. To make the point clearer, if after a dispute settlement case, the two parties 
agree that compensation should take the form of reduced tariffs on a particular product 
coming from the winning party’s country, what this means is that other countries 
exporting those same products to the losing party still pay the old higher tariff which 
would mean that their goods would be more expensive (thus leading to lower profits) 
than those coming from the winning party. This is therefore a nullification of benefits 
accruing to them.
It is more likely that where the recommendation of the DSB is not carried out, suspension 
of concessions will be resorted to. In order to this, there must be a “request for 
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of 
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements”.44 Where the parties 
cannot reach an agreement as to the level of suspension of concessions, arbitration is 
resorted to, to determine the amount of nullification or impairment suffered by the 
Member. 45  When this process is completed, the winning Member may retaliate by 
imposing tariffs on a particular sector until the offensive measure is withdrawn. The 
reason ‘retaliation’ is most often resorted to is it is not a voluntary measure and it is not 
44 Art 22:2 DSU.
45 Art 22:6 DSU.
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dependent on the Member in breach. It is a unilateral action taken by the winning 
Member, which makes it easier to accomplish. It is also a better way to ensure 
compliance with a ruling. 
Retaliation however has its disadvantages. One major problem with it is that it is usually 
another sector which is suffers the retaliatory action, and not the sector in which there 
was a violation in the first place.46 For instance in the EC- Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones) case,47 the U.S retaliated on confectionaries, flowers, 
vegetables etc., and so these other producers in the EU had to pay for the harm caused by 
the ban on hormone treated beef from the U.S. By increasing the tariffs on particular 
products, the opportunity cost of the benefit derived is too high. Increasing tariffs 
necessarily means increasing the domestic prices of the goods. This makes them more 
unaffordable, therefore reducing the quantity coming on, and eventually harming the 
economy. It is a typical case of “biting one’s nose to spite the face”. Finally, retaliation 
goes against the underlying objective of the WTO system which is generally to promote 
rather than restrict international trade.48
For smaller developing countries, the effect of its retaliatory action may not be felt 
especially where the violator is a Member with whom it has minimal trading relations. 
Retaliatory actions are limited to suspension of concessions by the complainant within its 
territory, and cannot be applied outside its borders.49
46 Art 22:7 DSU: “The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine 
the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine 
whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or 
impairment & the parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final… The DSB shall 
be informed promptly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall upon request, grant 
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent 
with the decision of the arbitrator…”
47 WT/DS138.
48 Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi-
The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium 
(hereafter ‘Sutherland Report’) par 240.
49 As part of the discussions on possible areas of reform of the DSU, it has been 
suggested that a provision should be made whereby Members can transfer its retaliatory 
rights to an interested Member where it is unable to obtain compensation or disinclined to 
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The time span for resolving disputes is another crucial point which diminishes the gains 
of dispute settlement remedies. The dispute settlement process even with its merits is far 
from being perfect. From the time when a Member requests consultation up until the time 
when the measure is withdrawn, the period of time which has elapsed is anything from 1-
3 years.50 There is bound to be a huge amount of lost trade which must have occurred 
within that time and for which there is no remedy because WTO remedies are prospective 
in nature.51
What is more, the existing remedies offer no relief to those actually injured i.e. the 
producers and exporters carrying out the actual trading activities. The way the WTO 
dispute settlement works is that it is only governments that can bring an action and not 
the individual traders.52 Therefore, unless the offending measure is withdrawn, no other 
remedy will alleviate the harm done to the traders. Whatever remedy is applied does not 
benefit the particularly affected parties. It is either that some other parties benefit, or the 
government revenue is increased. Until the dispute settlement process makes provision 
exercise retaliatory right. In exchange a benefit possibly a cash payment would be 
negotiated at a level not exceeding the authorized level of suspension. Such a situation 
would particularly benefit small economies if they can trade retaliatory rights with larger 
countries that can deal a more decisive blow on the violator through the suspension of 
concessions. See “Trade and Development: The Doha Development Agenda” World 
Trade Report 2003 p177, available on 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr03_chap2b_e.pdf> (accessed on 
April 28 2006).
50 The various time lines provided for in the various stages of dispute settlement in 
the DSU reflect this: 60 days for consultation, 6-9 months for panel deliberation, 60-90 
days for Appellate Body deliberations, up to 15 months as a reasonable period for 
implementation of the ruling.
51 By saying that dispute settlement remedies are prospective, it means that they are 
essentially ‘forward looking’. By ‘forward looking’, it means that remedies do not 
become applicable and calculable until a ruling is eventually handed down, whatever the 
remedy may be. In other words, there is no remedy for the harm that has already 
taken place. It is only ongoing harm (where there is refusal of compliance) that can be 
remedied.
52 The WTO is made up of Member States; therefore it is these Members that can 
access the dispute settlement process. However, the actual traders can lobby their 
governments to institute an action on their behalf.
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for private party rights to participate,53 some way has to be found to compensate the 
individuals who actually lose by the application of the WTO inconsistent measure.
The problem with dispute remedies can be seen in several cases that have come to dispute 
settlement. In the case of EC- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas,54 after obtaining a ruling which the European Communities did not comply 
with, Ecuador requested authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions or other 
obligations to the European Communities under the TRIPS Agreement, the GATS and 
GATT 1994 in an amount of US$450m. This request was granted although the level was 
reduced to US$210m. Even though the violation was in the goods sector under the 
GATT, Ecuador had to request retaliation on other sectors under other Agreements 
because suspension in the goods sector was “not practicable or effective”. The problem 
was with bananas, yet the EC sectors which would be punished for this were the 
intellectual property and wholesale trade services sectors.
The Arbitrators in that case recognized that;55
Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case which 
involves a developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may 
find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or possible for it to 
implement the suspension authorized by the DSB for the full amount 
of the level of nullification and impairment estimated by us in all of 
the sector and/or under all agreements mentioned above combined.
53 Under the International Centre on the Settlement of Investment disputes (ICSID) 
Convention however, a private investor may bring an action against its host State. This is 
one area in international law where private parties are allowed to bring cases against 
sovereign States. The Appellate Body in US- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R) allowed limited participation of non-governmental 
parties through the use of amicus curiae briefs. These briefs are persuasive only and not 
binding.
54 WT/DS27.
55 European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas- Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB/ECU)
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Apart from the fact that other sectors in the EC would have to pay the price for banana 
violations, the banana exporters in Ecuador are not any better off by their government 
retaliating against the EC in the area of TRIPS and GATS. The only effect is that there 
might be a restoration of the balance of concessions between the two countries, but this in 
itself is not sufficient because the effect is in a different area. 
This same situation has arisen in the US- Gambling56 case in which Antigua & Barbuda 
won its case against the U.S. The U.S did not comply with the ruling, which means that 
Antigua & Barbuda will be left to come up with creative means to get back at the United 
States. Even if it succeeds in doing so, the trade relations between the U.S. and Antigua 
& Barbuda are not sufficient for Antigua & Barbuda to substantially threaten the United 
States. 57   The point is this: Something needs to be done urgently to address these 
imbalances which make it difficult for developing countries to derive any benefits from 
WTO dispute settlement, even where they have taken the step of bringing the case before 
the DSB.
3 Financial Compensation as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Remedy
3.1 The Aim of Monetary Compensation
Simply put, financial compensation should be considered as an alternative dispute 
settlement remedy for those Members of the WTO for whom the other remedies are not 
viable alternatives i.e. low-income countries. That being said, the purpose of monetary 
compensation is a key factor in deciding its characteristics. It will also determine the 
success of the remedy. As a remedy, what gap will financial compensation be filling? 
Should it be solely to compensate for the loss which a Member has suffered as a result of 
a violation? Should it be to punish the wrongdoer? Should it serve as a deterrent? Or 
56 See supra note 37.
57 The Foreign Trade Statistics as prepared by the United States Census Bureau 
shows that there was a balance of trade between the US and Antigua to the tune of 
$185.5m, and in 2004 the balance of trade was $121.3 available on 
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2484.html> (accessed on April 25, 2006)
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should it be to remedy a trade distortion? Understanding the purpose of monetary 
compensation will go a long way in garnering support for it and making it effective. 
Financial compensation as a remedy is not an end in itself. It is important to clarify that 
removal of the violation is always the preferred option in any dispute settlement cases. 
This is because it is important to maintain the certainty of the trading arrangements and 
the agreements which each Member has bound itself to. Firstly, financial compensation 
would act retroactively providing a remedy for an economy that suffers for the time that 
an offending measure is in place.58 Second, it is a remedy that should confer a benefit on 
countries that are not able to derive the benefits from ‘retaliation’; there should still be 
some way in which they can derive benefits from the dispute settlement system. 
So far, the proposals for monetary compensation state suggest that its aim is to provide 
reparation for damages caused.59 Financial compensation must be structured in such a 
way that the sum compensates the recipient i.e. the low- income country for harm
suffered. While it could be argued that this does not necessarily stop the violation, at least 
it puts the other country in a better off position than if there was no monetary 
compensation, and the violation was still not removed. Without financial compensation, 
if there was no removal of the violation, the winning party would most probably have to 
resort to retaliation. As stated earlier, retaliation does not solve the problem for most of 
these low-income countries. Therefore, a monetary pay-off would remove the need to 
resort to retaliation compulsorily even though this would not provide any benefits.
Monetary compensation should also serve as a compliance-inducing mechanism. If the 
total figure is stiff enough, this should motivate the violator to bring its measures into 
conformity with the DSB ruling as quickly as possible so as to reduce the money it would 
have to keep paying. Thus, compensation should be calculated in such a way that not 
only is the complainant compensated for the harm suffered, but the violator should be put 
58 This is against the usual prospective nature of WTO remedies. See supra note 52.
59 See for e.g. Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek “Financial 
Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement”, 
(2005) 8 JIEL 101-126 at 124.
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in a position where it would be pressed to comply with the recommendation of the 
Panel/Appellate Body.
3.2 Tracing the Origin of the Clamour for Monetary Compensation60
In 1965, an effort was made by GATT developing countries to add monetary 
compensation to the list of dispute settlement remedies by proposing that monetary 
damages to be paid to developing countries injured by GATT-illegal trade restrictions. 
The theory of the developing country proposal for monetary compensation was that 
GATT-illegal trade restrictions caused serious harms to the fragile economies of 
developing countries. The developing countries argued that the prospective remedies 
were not enough to remedy the harm already done. Instead, they proposed, developing 
countries should be entitled to collect retroactive damages in the form of money awards. 
The money damages proposal was advocated strenuously through a long series of 
committee meetings. Developed countries opposed the proposal with equal conviction. At 
that time, they felt that money damages were simply not possible. 61 The proposals were 
however not adopted. They also proposed adding sterner sanctions for developing 
country complaints e.g. monetary damages and collective trade sanctions. South Africa 
and Brazil were the earliest proponents of this remedy.62
In November 1984, a proposal in this regard was put before the Council by Nicaragua, 
that in the case of a matter raised by a less-developed contracting party, the 
recommendations of the Contracting Parties may include measures of compensation for 
60 The terms “monetary compensation” and “financial compensation” are used 
interchangeably throughout this paper.
61 Robert E. Hudec, “Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute 
Settlement”, available at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf>, 
(accessed on April 27 2006). The proposals are contained in the GATT document series 
COM.TD/F/W.1 (April 27 1965); COM.TD/F/W.4 (October 11 1965).
62 Robert E. Hudec Enforcing International Trade Law- The Evolution of the 
Modern GATT Legal System (1993) 34.
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injury caused if the circumstances are serious enough to justify such measures.63  As part 
of the negotiations leading to the establishment of the WTO, the case for monetary 
compensation was suggested quite a number of times. For instance, in the DSU 
negotiating sessions, it was proposed as part of special and differential treatment that "at 
the request of a less-developed contracting party which has only limited retaliatory power 
vis-à-vis major trading partners, panel reports may include an appropriate 
recommendation on the amount of compensation due in case the main panel findings are 
not implemented by a developed contracting party within such time-limit". 64  The 
proponent of this suggestion argued that “also developed contracting parties could 
request a GATT panel to include into the panel report a recommendation on the amount 
of compensation due in case the main panel findings were not implemented".65
The calls for monetary compensation have not diminished with time. In the current 
negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding under the Doha Round,66 the Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) group has continued the push for monetary compensation. In 
the LDC proposal,67 it was stated that; “…[a] strong case of monetary compensation can 
be made. This remedy is important for developing and least developed countries, and for 
any economy that suffers for the time that an offending measure remains in place.”
The suggestions of financial compensation as an alternative remedy have gone beyond 
proposals from poor developing countries. Apparently, the WTO hierarchy has taken note 
of the possibility of financial compensation as a remedy. In June 2003, the then Director-
General of the WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi commissioned a consultative board of eight 
eminent persons to look at the state of the WTO as an institution, to study and clarify the 
institutional challenges that the system faced and to consider how the WTO could be 
63 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement: Communication from Nicaragua.
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/15 (November 6 1987).
64 MTN.GNG/NGl3/W/l9, p.6, para.3b.
65
“Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement Differential and More Favourable Treatment of 
Developing Countries in the GATT Dispute Settlement System”- MTN.GNG/NGl3/W/27 (30 June l988), 
available on <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/urdsu.htm> (accessed on February 28, 2006).
66 The Doha Round which is known as the ‘Doha Development Round’ was 
launched in Doha, Qatar in 2001.
67
 “Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by the LDC 
Group”- World Trade Organisation TN/DS/W/17.
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reinforced and equipped to meet them.68 In its report, the consultative board recognized 
that the language of the DSU is not 100% explicitly clear that withdrawal of the offensive 
measure is a mandatory obligation.69 This in turn leads to a situation where alternative 
measures must be resorted to since retaliation as a remedy goes against the underlying 
objective of the WTO system generally to promote rather than restrict international trade.
According to the board, one proposed solution is to allow monetary compensation from 
the party required to comply with a dispute settlement report, to substitute for 
compensatory market access measures by the winning aggrieved disputant. The report is 
a bit guarded in its recommendation however and suggests that, “some experimentation 
in this regard could be useful, but great care must be exercised to be sure that monetary 
compensation is only a temporary fallback approach pending full compliance, otherwise 
the ‘buy-out’ problems will occur”.70 According to the board, for poorer WTO Members, 
especially the least-developed countries with their narrow participation in world trade, the 
‘buy-out’ attitude could nullify the value of their pursuing dispute settlement cases.
3.3 Beneficiaries of Monetary Compensation
One recurring theme in the calls for monetary compensation as seen from the above is 
that the beneficiaries should typically be least developed counties or poor developing 
countries. To date, only one least developed country Member of the WTO has sought to 
resolve a trade dispute through the WTO dispute settlement process by bringing a 
complaint.71 According to the LDC group, this is not because these countries have no 
concerns worth referring to the DSB, but rather due to the structural and other difficulties 
posed by the system.72 Perhaps a record of the usage of dispute settlement will give an 
68 The report of the consultative board is known as the Sutherland Report and the 
full text is available on 
<http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf> (accessed on 
February 2, 2006).
69 Sutherland Report para 241.
70 Id para 243.
71 See supra note 11.
72 See supra note 68.
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insight into why the calls are from this particular group. Typically, they are the ones who 
have been lagging behind in making use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
The following table shows WTO complaints grouped by income classification73,74:
Total Number of Complaints under the DSU
335





































73 The table classifies complaining and responding parties in WTO disputes by the income level of 
their economy.  The classifications are based on data and terminology from the World Bank.  A country's 

















An attempt was made by two African LDCs to make use of the dispute settlement 
mechanism in the United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton Dispute75 case. This case 
brought to the fore, the challenges faced by LDCs in dispute settlement and raised all 
over again the need for monetary compensation for poor countries. On February 6 2003, 
Brazil requested the establishment of a Panel on the grounds that the U.S was in violation 
of Articles 5(c), 6.3(b), (c) and (d), 3.1(a) (including item (j) of the Illustrative List of 
Export Subsidies in Annex I), 3.1(b), and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement; Articles 3.3, 7.1, 8, 
9.1 and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture; and Article III:4 of GATT 1994. Brazil 
was of the view that the U.S statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures listed 
above were inconsistent with these provisions as such and as applied. Two least 
developing countries, Chad and Benin Republic, participated as third parties in the case. 
The Panel held, and the Appellate Body upheld its decision that the U.S was indeed in 
violation of its WTO obligations.
Cotton accounts for approximately 40% of export earnings in Benin, and 30% in Chad 
and Mali. 76 According to a report, American subsidies cost Africans $301m in 2001:
Mali lost 1.7% of its GDP, and 8% from its exports earnings, similarly Burkina Faso lost 
1% of its GDP and 12% of its export income, while Benin lost 1.4% of its GDP and 9% 
75 WT/DS267/AB/R.
76
“Cotton and Developing Countries: A Case Study in Policy Incoherence” 
prepared by the World Bank Group and available at 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote10.pdf>
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of its export income.77 So much damage had been done to African cotton- producing 
economies as a result of the United States’ export subsidies and domestic support for its 
upland cotton farmers, yet none of them took the initiative to bring a complaint against 
the United States. It was not until Brazil brought a complaint that Chad and Benin joined 
the dispute, and only as third parties. 
While the dispute on the US cotton subsidies was going on however, Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Chad and Mali had prepared a joint proposal on a sectoral initiative on cotton.78
Their proposals were based on the fact that African cotton producers take huge losses on 
their cotton because certain Member countries of the WTO continue to apply support 
measures that distort global market prices and African countries cannot compete in giving 
the same level support to their cotton producers. Their proposal therefore is that all kinds 
of support should be eliminated and compensation provided until the support is 
eliminated. Subsequently, they proposed monetary compensation as one of their focal 
points after discarding retaliation and increased concessions as being inapplicable or 
ineffective. What this means is that the countries who prepared the joint proposal 
considered financial compensation to be a just remedy for the harm they have suffered. It 
is possible therefore that if financial compensation had been an available remedy in 
dispute settlement, these countries could have initiated a complaint. 
Their proposal79 among other things, calls for:
• A transitional measure in the form of financial compensation for cotton-producing 
LDCs to offset the injury caused by the support for production and export;
• Such financial compensation should be calculated in proportion to the subsidies 
granted by countries which support their cotton production, taking into account 
77 World Trade Net Newsletter, Vol. 4 No. 6 (June 2003), available on 
<http://www.intracen.org/worldtradenet/docs/whatsnew/newsletters_2003/newslettervol4
no6.pdf> (accessed on March 3, 2006).
78
“WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in 
Favour of Cotton”- TN/AG/GEN/4 (16 May 2003). This proposal was written by Benin 
Republic, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali under the umbrella of the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific (ACP) on the WTO negotiations on the cotton sector.
79 Id para 38.
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the direct and indirect effects of support for cotton production on the economies 
of LDCs;
• The compensation should be sufficiently high to constitute an additional incentive 
to decrease or phase out subsidies as soon as possible, but this compensation will 
decrease (terminate) as and when the subsidies are reduced (abolished).
3.4      Precedents for Monetary Compensation
Monetary compensation in international trade agreements is not a novel idea. There are in 
existence, international trade agreements that make provision for financial compensation 
as a dispute settlement remedy. Under the Unites States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 
provision is made for financial compensation. The FTA permits monetary assessments to 
be substituted for retaliation in normal trade barrier cases.80 If the parties are unable to 
agree on an amount, the amount of monetary assessment is set at 50% of the level of 
nullification or impairment determined by the panel.81
Even under the WTO, there is one instance where financial compensation has been used 
to settle a dispute. In United States- Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act,82  the EC 
contended that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act which permits, under certain 
conditions, the playing of radio and television music in public places (bars, shops, 
restaurants, etc.) without the payment of a royalty fee, is inconsistent with US obligations 
under Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires Members to comply with 
Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention. The Panel report which was adopted on July 27 
2000, found that indeed the United States had acted contrary to its obligations under 
TRIPS and it did not fall under any of the exemptions provided for under TRIPS.
As a result of discussions to find a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute, the 
United States and the European Communities agreed pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU to 
enter into arbitration in order to determine the level of nullification or impairment of 




benefits caused by section 110(5)(B) of the US Copyright Act. After the arbitration, the 
parties reached a temporary resolution of the dispute, which arrangement covered the 
period through 20 December 2004. The terms of the arrangement were as follows:83
1. The United States would make a lump-sum payment in the amount of $3.3 million to a 
fund to be set up by performing rights societies in the European Communities for the 
provision of general assistance to their members and the promotion of authors' rights. 
2. The Payment would serve as a mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement regarding 
the dispute, for the three-year period commencing 21 December 2001. 
4         Negotiating Monetary Compensation
Under the original GATT 1947, there was no provision for any kind of compensation in 
the case of a refusal to withdraw an inconsistent measure. The only applicable remedy 
was ‘retaliation’ after authorization had been given.84
Compensation as a remedy was developed under the WTO, and was reflected in the DSU. 
Let us take a look at what the DSU says about compensation: “[i]f the Member fails to 
bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into 
compliance…such Member…shall enter into negotiations… with a view to developing 
mutually acceptable compensation.” It states further that “…[c]ompensation is voluntary 
and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.” There is no 
specification in the DSU as to what mutually acceptable compensation entails. WTO 
jurisprudence has it however that compensation should take the form of increased 
concessions.85 Various factors must be taken into consideration in developing monetary 
83 US- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act- Notification of a Mutually 
Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement (WT/DS160/23).
84 Art XXIII:2 GATT 1947 provides that “…[i]f the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may 
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting 
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they 
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances…”
85 Joel P. Trachtman, “Building the WTO Cathedral” (February 17, 2006) 8, 
available at Social Sciences Research Network: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=815844>.
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compensation as a remedy. How these issues will be dealt with to a large extent will 
determine the success of the measure. 
4.1      Key Elements of Financial Compensation
4.1.1    Amendment of the DSU to Accommodate Financial Compensation
To determine how financial compensation would work, it is important to establish 
whether there is a provision for it under the DSU. If there is no provision for financial 
compensation, it means an amendment of the DSU is necessary. To become enforceable 
there must be a provision in the text of the DSU that could be understood to provide for 
financial compensation. From the content of the DSU, there is nothing that precludes 
compensation from being financial provided that “it is voluntary and consistent with the 
covered agreements”. However, an amendment of the DSU would be necessary to make 
explicit provision for financial compensation in the event of non-compliance with the 
DSB ruling.86
Making financial compensation an alternative remedy has to start with defining clearly 
what ‘compensation’ is under the DSU. Currently, there is no definition of compensation. 
Compensation must be defined explicitly to include the provision of additional 
concessions and/or financial compensation. The clause could read like this: 
“compensation includes but is not limited to monetary compensation”.87
The next stage in the amendment of the DSU to accommodate financial compensation is 
redefining ‘voluntary’. Looking at the current provisions, what does it mean for 
compensation to be voluntary and consistent with the covered agreements? By voluntary, 
it means that no party can compel the other to give or to accept compensation. One party 
may offer compensation as a possible remedy but the other party is not bound to accept it. 
It therefore leaves an escape route for the parties, thus making it a very unreliable 
remedy. There are two alternative ways of solving the issue of voluntariness. One is that 
86 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek (2005).
87 The LDC proposal suggests that “there is a need to clarify that compensation 
should not take the form of an enhanced market access if this will prejudice other 
Members and that monetary compensation is to be preferred.”
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the term voluntary should be deleted totally from Article 22:1 of the DSU, like the LDC 
proposal states,88 in order to reduce the freedom in it and to make it mandatory. On the 
other hand, ‘voluntary’ could be qualified instead of being deleted. Since the purpose of 
financial compensation is to benefit poor developing countries, then the voluntariness 
should be left to the complainant and not to the respondent i.e. the complainant should 
have the option of deciding whether it wants financial compensation or not.
The DSU provides further that compensation must be “consistent with the covered 
agreements”. This is a very wide provision and can be interpreted in various ways but 
basically it means that compensation must not go against the spirit of the WTO 
agreements in generally. Tentatively, this phrase has been considered to mean that 
compensation must be provided on an MFN basis.89 The MFN principle is one of the 
pillars of the WTO.90 However, providing monetary compensation is not “an advantage, 
favour, or immunity” which must be immediately and unconditionally granted to every 
Member in the areas of custom duties and rules relating to importation and exportation. 
Therefore by providing that financial compensation is to be consistent with the covered 
agreements, this does not thereby imply that it is to be provided on an MFN basis. There 
will therefore be no need to amend the DSU to remove that phrase.
4.1.2   Monetary Compensation as Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment
A recurring theme throughout the WTO covered agreements is the need to take into 
account the special needs of its least developed Members.91 As a result of this, there are 
88 See supra note 68.
89 See Australia’s submission during the DSB Special Session on the review of the 
DSU, held on March 14, 2002. A report of the meeting is provided by the Third World 
Network and is available on <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twe276b.htm> (accessed on 
April 28 2006); see also Joost Pauwelyn (2000) AJIL 343.
90 See infra note 115. The other pillars are Market Access Commitments- Article II 
GATT 1947 provides that each contracting party is to afford treatment no less favourable 
than that which it has bound, to the commerce of the other contracting parties; and 
National Treatment- Article III GATT 1947 provides that the products of the territory of 
any contracting party shall not be subject to treatment different from that applied to like 
domestic products; and Market Access Commitments.
91 The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation recognizes 
that; “…[t]here is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the 
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various provisions through all the covered agreements which are for the benefit of the 
less developed Members of the WTO only. This treatment of less developed country 
Members of the WTO is known as ‘special and differential treatment’.92
The DSU also has provisions regarding least developed Members.93 Least developed 
country Members are by virtue of that fact, entitled to special considerations which are 
not available to the other Members. Advantage should be taken of this fact. To make 
financial compensation an effective remedy for poor WTO Members, it should fall under 
S&D treatment so that it is only this category of countries that can have access to 
whatever provisions are applicable here. Not only should it be negotiated under S&D 
treatment, it should be phrased differently from the general S&D treatment provisions. 
For once, there must be phrased in a way that makes it a mandatory obligation. Typical 
special and differential treatment provisions under the WTO are not binding. They are 
only best endeavour provisions which developed countries are encouraged to apply,94 and 
for which there is no remedy for failure to apply S&D treatment. 
4.1.3   Calculation of Compensation
The factors to be considered in calculating financial compensation need to be 
contemplated. Article 22:4 of the DSU provides that “[t]he level of the suspension of 
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the 
needs of their economic development”.
92 In the recent Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in Hong Kong in 2005, par 35 of 
the Ministerial Declaration specifies that all S&D treatment provisions are an integral 
part of the WTO agreement and that its provisions must be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. Par 36
states in part that “[w]e take note of the work done on the Agreement-specific proposals, 
especially the five LDC proposals…” One of these proposals is that making a case for 
monetary compensation.
93 Art 24:1 of the DSU provides for special procedures involving least developed country Members 
thus; “[a]t all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures 
involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special situation 
of least-developed country Members…”
94 For instance, Art XXXVI GATT 1994 deals generally with provisions to aid the 
less-developed Members. Para 8 provides that “[t]he adoption of measures to give effect 
to these principles and objectives shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort on 
the part of the contracting parties both individually and jointly”. That clause is phrased so 
loosely and makes no compelling demands of the more developed Members.
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concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of 
the nullification of impairment”. This same formula can be applied in calculating the 
value of financial compensation. The nullification or impairment suffered by the 
complainant should include actual losses as well as consequential losses.95 The amount 
should be calculated from the time the inconsistent measure was put into operation until 
the removal of the measure. Using this method would fulfill the aim of monetary 
compensation which is to fully compensate the complainant for the loss suffered as a 
result of the violation of WTO obligations by the respondent, and to act as a retrospective 
remedy.
In the draft decision concerning measures in favour of cotton,96 WTO Members proposed 
to establish a transitional financial compensation mechanism in favour of the cotton-
exporting LDCs affected by subsidies. The draft contained factors to be included in 
calculating compensation: Starting on 1 January 2004, and until the domestic support 
measures and subsidies granted to the production and export of cotton have been totally 
dismantled, Members that have granted these subsidies will be called upon to grant 
financial compensation equivalent to the amount of the loss in export revenue suffered by 
the LDCs affected by these subsidies. The annual amount of compensation to be paid 
shall correspond to the estimated losses suffered, calculated on the basis of the statistics 
supplied by the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC). The amount of the 
overall financial compensation to be paid shall be adjusted in proportion to the subsidy 
reduction efforts of the countries contributing to the compensation fund. The 
compensation granted to the LDCs shall be calculated in proportion to their respective 
shares in the production and export of cotton.
95 In actions for breach of contract, compensatory damages are calculated using 
actual damages, consequential damages as well as incidental damages. The actual 
damage is the amount incurred as a result of the inconsistent measure e.g. through 
increased tariffs or additional expenses met in order to meet standards. Consequential 
damage would be the amount of trade which is lost because of the measures e.g. if less 
quantity of a product is exported as a result o f the increase in cost, resulting in reduced 
profits.
96
“Draft Decision Concerning Specific Measures in Favour of Cotton with a View 




Some aspects relating to the procedure also need to be discussed. One of these issues 
relates to timing. There needs to be established a time frame for when the request for 
financial compensation will first be made. Financial compensation becomes an 
alternative remedy where there is a refusal to comply with a ruling. A complainant who 
has won a dispute does not automatically become entitled to financial compensation once 
the decision is made in its favour. It is only after the time determined to be a reasonable 
time for compliance with a ruling has elapsed that a request for financial compensation 
can be made. As long as the ruling is complied with, there will be no requirement of 
financial compensation. In the absence of this, just as in the case of retaliation, there will 
need to be an arbitration proceeding to determine the amount of financial compensation. 
This leads to the issue of who decides on whether financial compensation is to be paid. 
Since financial compensation is a special remedy, the winning party should be allowed to 
decide whether it wants compensation in the form of additional concessions, suspension 
of equivalent concessions, or financial compensation.
5 The Debate on Monetary Compensation
Like any new proposal, concerns have been raised on the practicality of such a measure 
and the modalities of its application. In discussing these issues, it should be borne in 
mind that monetary compensation, like the present system of compensation does not 
replace the obligation to comply with the DSB ruling. It is only supposed to be a 
temporary measure until the violation is removed, and to compensate for the damage 
already suffered while the violation was in place. 
5.1     Thorny issues in  monetary compensation97
Eligibility Requirements: Issues surrounding eligibility for the use of financial 
compensation are likely to be potential problems of the remedy. Is monetary 
compensation to be made generally applicable? Who can demand it and against whom? 
97 See generally Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek (2005).
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It is suggested that at its inception, it should be available at the request of low income 
Members, because these are the Members who feel the impact of trade violations more, 
and for whom trade retaliation will not be a viable option.98 This then raises the question 
of the classification of low income countries. The United Nations has a classification of 
countries according to development levels, while the World Bank also has its own 
classification according to income levels. It would be important to resolve which of these 
classifications would be ideal in determining the eligibility for financial compensation. A 
re-classification could even be done for these purposes. My suggestion is that the 
classification can be done according to the share of world trade of each Member. The 
WTO has trade statistics for each of its Members. A threshold should be established 
according to volume of trade and any Member which falls below this threshold should be 
eligible for financial compensation as an alternative remedy. Using the same logic 
therefore, financial compensation will be available against every Member that does not 
fall within this threshold. In other words, once a Member is not determined to be eligible 
for financial compensation, it becomes liable to pay financial compensation where the 
circumstances warrant it.
The remedy should only be applicable by this group and not against them. The whole 
purpose of financial compensation right now is for disadvantaged countries to have an 
alternative remedy available to them. It would defeat this purpose if a remedy which is 
supposed to be for their benefit is used against them. Consequently, only poor WTO 
Members should be able to request for financial compensation, and they should only be 
able to request this against the richer Members and not against one another. Where there 
is a dispute among amongst the beneficiaries of financial compensation, then they should 
resort to the traditional remedy of retaliation where there is refusal to comply with a 
ruling.  It should be remembered that the problem of retaliation is mostly felt where the 
parties are unequal trading partners. But where the parties are in the same economic 
category, then retaliation will be more of a threat since the impact will be felt by the 
violator/respondent and will cause it to comply with the ruling as quickly as possible.
98 See discussion earlier on the problems with the existing dispute settlement 
remedies.
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Multiple Party Pay-off: The questions that arise here deal with the requirement of 
monetary compensation in a situation where the claim is brought by more than one party. 
Is every complainant entitled to financial compensation? What happens in a case where 
some of the complainants are small economies, and the rest are not? What is the position 
of parties who join the action as third parties? Are they also going to be entitled to the 
monetary compensation? 
Firstly, to be entitled to a remedy, a party has to be a complainant and not merely a third 
party. As it stands at present and unless their rights are reviewed, third parties would have 
no claim to financial compensation. Although Article 22 of the DSU99 does not speak 
expressly of the ‘complainant’, but rather a party “invoking” the dispute settlement 
procedures, for textual and contextual reasons it cannot be suggested that third parties 
invoke such procedures. The fact that Article 10 of the DSU allows any WTO Member 
having a substantial interest in a matter before a Panel (i.e. third parties) and having 
notified its interest to the DSB at the time of the establishment of the Panel, to be given 
an opportunity to be heard by the Panel by making written submissions does not mean, 
however, that third parties thereby “invoked” the dispute settlement procedures.  Third 
parties are merely invited to present their views during a special session of the first 
substantive meeting and their written submissions are attached to, the Panel’s report. 
When participating in the proceedings only as interested parties, third parties ‘by-pass’
this essential component of the dispute settlement procedures i.e. accessing remedies.100
Therefore, they may only benefit in a systemic manner from the outcome of a Panel 
decision where a Respondent does implement a Panel’s recommendations and rulings.  
This is because the corrected measure will usually be of general application and thus may 
be directly beneficial to Third Parties. Co-complainants should however be entitled to 
financial compensation since they all ‘invoked’ the dispute settlement process. 
99 Art 22 deals with compensation and suspension of concessions.
100 As a third party in United States- Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act see supra
note 83, Australia was a third party but was not eligible for the compensation 
arrangement between the EC and the US. In the requests for the composition of an 
arbitral panel to determine the level of concessions, Australia was explicitly excluded 
from the proceedings.
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To determine what parties will be entitled to financial compensation where there is a 
varied mix of complainants, the eligibility requirements as suggested above can be 
resorted to. Any complainant which is not entitled to financial compensation still has the 
other dispute settlement remedies available to it.
Enforceability: Limao & Saggi101 are of the opinion that the major problem facing the 
implementation of a dispute remedy based on financial compensation is its 
enforcement.102 Even after making a provision for financial compensation in the DSU 
and the DSB has authorized the payment of compensation, it would be of no consequence 
if violators refuse to pay the remedy and there is no means to ensure compliance. The 
success of the remedy will depend on its enforcement. Ultimately, the violating country 
has to agree to pay the fine, unlike in the case of retaliation where the violating country is 
not the deciding factor. Presently under the WTO, there are no compliance-inducing 
mechanisms, which is why retaliation is the remedy most resorted to where there is a 
refusal to comply with a ruling.103
Although there is no reason to conclude that there will not be compliance, as there has 
been a good record so far of compliance with DSB recommendations,104 one suggestion 
is that a system can be established whereby each Member posts a bond of a given 
amount, as part of its Membership commitments, with the understanding that its bond 
101 Nuno Limao & Kamal Saggi, “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation 
in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements”, (2006) available at 
<http://faculty.smu.edu/ksaggi/LIMAO-SAGGI.pdf>
102 It should be stated at this point that this problem is not peculiar to enforcement in 
cases where financial compensation is the required remedy. There are generally no 
enforcement provisions under the DSU. Thus finding a means of enforcing the remedy of 
financial compensation should begin with finding means of enforcing DSB rulings 
generally. For a discussion on enforcement of WTO rules and dispute settlement reports 
generally, see Joost Pauwelyn (2000).
103 Retaliation does not require any action on the part of the respondent, and no 
permission is sought from it. Once a respondent does not comply with a ruling, then the 
complainant can go ahead to arbitration to determine the level of suspension of 
concessions.
104 See supra note 34.
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will be used to pay a fine where there is a ruling to that effect.105 These bonds will be 
posted in an escrow account so that it does not remain under the control of the Member 
which posts it. A system has to be devised as to the ratio of each Member’s bond. I would 
suggest that the system of Membership contributions should also be followed here. The 
budget of the WTO is derived by contributions from its Members.106 These contributions 
are determined according to each Member’s percentage share of international trade, based 
on trade in goods, services, and intellectual property.107 Thus, the ratio of each Member’s 
bond should be determined according to this system.108 Of course the beneficiaries of 
financial compensation would not be required to post bonds. The purpose of the bonds is 
strictly to pay financial compensation should such a situation arise and since financial 
compensation is not an optional remedy against its proposed beneficiaries, there will be 
no need for them to post any bond. This leaves the issue of what happens where the 
amount determined as compensation exceeds the amount which has been placed as a 
bond or a situation where the amount posted as bond has been exhausted and there is a 
need to pay compensation. One suggestion is that the amount outstanding should be 
added to the contribution of that Member. The amount outstanding as financial 
compensation can be added up to the contribution of such a Member.
Another way to ensure compliance is by making a rule that where there is refusal to pay 
compensation, then the Member state will no longer have the right to use the dispute 
settlement process against any other Member. 
Valuation problems: Another concrete problem which has been associated with 
compensation is the valuation of the amount of the compensation. Should compensation 
105 See supra note 102.
106 Art VII: 2(a) of the Marrakesh Agreement. Para 4 states in particular that “[e]ach 
Member shall promptly contribute to the WTO its share in the expenses of the WTO in 
accordance with the financial regulations adopted by the General Council.”
107 See “The WTO”, a portal on the WTO website which provides information about 
the WTO. <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib05_e.htm>
108 The baseline figure is something that has to be worked out by economists. My 
suggestion only deals with the proportion of each Member’s bond in relation to the other 
Members.
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equal lost trade volumes only, or lost trade volumes as well as lost profits?109 From what 
time should the amount of the compensation begin to be computed? Bronckers & van den 
Broek argue that for monetary compensation not to end up being high amounts similar to 
a fine, either lost trade volumes or lost profits should be used as the measure of 
calculation.110 What this means is that only the effective losses should be computed and 
not the potential gains that have been nullified and impaired. 
In my opinion however, both factors should be taken into account in computing the total 
figure.111 Provided punitive damages are not included, it is not enough of a reason to state 
that because the amount will be too high, both indices should not be used. In normal 
business disputes, damages are calculated by including actual damages, consequential 
damages, and incidental damages (this is as distinct from punitive damages, which is an 
additional amount imposed to punish the offender for its action). This should be taken 
into consideration by a Member that refuses to remove the offending measure, and then it 
is up to it decide whether it is more worthwhile to keep the violation and pay the 
compensation instead. This could help to achieve one aim of financial compensation 
which is to induce compliance.
The tendency of buy-out of obligations: One of the major objections to monetary 
compensation is that it would allow governments to buy-out of their obligations by 
providing monetary compensation. This is a possibility whereby instead of removing the 
violation, a Member would opt to pay whatever amount is estimated as monetary 
compensation. If this happens, it could favour the rich and powerful countries which can 
afford buy- outs while retaining measures that harm and distort trade in a manner 
inconsistent with the rules of the system. In turn, this will diminish the extent to which 
109 In European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas- Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of 
the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB), when determining the level of suspension of concessions, the 
Panel rejected the attempts to calculate losses in terms of lost profits. It defined the harm 
as lost exports of wholesale services from the United States to the European 
Communities.
110 Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek (2005).
111 See my argument under ‘calculation of compensation’.
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companies, trading and investing, can rely on the rules to provide market 
predictability.112
While it is a real possibility that there would be a buy-out of obligations, it should be 
remembered that payment of monetary compensation does not remove the obligation to 
remove the violation. The violator still has the obligation of bringing its measures into 
conformity with its obligations. Therefore, like the present system of compensation, 
monetary compensation is only temporary until the violation is removed. And for the 
length of time while the payments are being made, the pay-offs are likely to be more 
beneficial to a poor country than a situation where it will be forced to raise tariffs in the 
quest for retaliation which would be of less benefit to it. Even with a ‘buy-out’ of 
obligations by the richer countries, financial compensation would solve the problem of a 
lack of an effective remedy for poor developing countries.
Violation of MFN Principle: If there is one thing that the WTO protects jealously, it is the 
maintenance of equity in the trading system. The preamble of GATT 1994 states in part
that its objectives are attained “...by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to …the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce”.
113
 This provision alludes to the MFN principle.114
It has been argued that the payment of financial compensation amounts to a violation of 
the MFN principle and may diminish the rights of Members other than the 
complainant. 115  This argument is neither here nor there. The payment of financial 
compensation does not fall under any of the criteria leading to the application of MFN 
112 Par 242 Sutherland Report.
113 Emphasis mine.
114 Art I:1 of the GATT provides that “[w]ith respect to customs duties of any kind 
…, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, any advantage favour privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party 
to any product originating in or destined for another country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties”.
115 Bernard O’Connor & Margareta Djordjevic, “Practical Aspects of Monetary 
Compensation: The US- Copyright Case” (2005)8 JIEL 127.
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rules. The MFN principle applies to “customs duties of any kind and rules and formalities 
in connection with importation and exportation.” The payment of a sum of money as 
compensation is neither a custom duty nor a rule relating to importation and exportation, 
which could confer an advantage on one country to the detriment of all others. So, the 
contention that financial compensation will violate MFN is not valid. 
Sharing of receipts of compensation: Another issue that has been raised in monetary 
compensation is the way the receipts are going to be disbursed. I submit however that this 
is not one of the staking points of the negotiations on monetary compensation. The 
government that brings the case is left to decide what it does with the money. It is not up 
to the losing Member, or the DSB to determine what is to be done with the money.116 The 
WTO is not a development organization. If it were, then maybe it would concern itself 
with what is done with the proceeds. 
Although the above issues are matters that must be dealt with in relation to financial 
compensation, there a lot of things to be said for financial compensation as a remedy. 
Below are some of the more compelling arguments in support of monetary compensation.
5.2     Arguments for monetary compensation
Greater participation of developing countries: We should not forget that the entire idea 
of monetary compensation is to provide an alternative remedy for poor developing 
countries so that they can make better use of the dispute settlement process. The idea has 
been generated particularly from the low-income countries who have been absent in the 
dispute settlement process at the WTO, and have cited the inadequacy of remedies as one 
of the reasons for their lack of participation. With this remedy in place, hopefully there 
will be increased appearances in dispute settlement made by the smaller countries.
116 Part of the provisions of the draft decision concerning specific measures in favour 
of cotton (supra note 97) was that “…the management of financial compensations would 
be the joint responsibility of the producers’ associations in the countries affected and the 
competent national structures…” 
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Compliance-inducing Effect: Because of the nature of monetary compensation, it is likely 
that it will induce better compliance with the ruling of the DSB. If the amount of the 
compensation is stiff enough (for instance if multiple parties are to be paid and it is a 
continuous payment until the violation is removed), it might make the country opt to 
remove the violation rather than pay the large sum of money. Besides, in the case of 
developing countries, this will probably be a better tool for inducing compliance than the 
current instruments of compensation and retaliation. 
Non- trade restrictive: In line with the WTO objective of facilitating trade among its 
Members, monetary compensation is not trade restrictive. This is because there is no 
requirement of trade rebalancing either through the provision of additional concessions or 
the suspension of equivalent concessions. All that is involved is making a sum of money 
available and normal trading activities continue undisrupted. Of course, the fact that the 
violation was not removed still remains and that in itself is a disruption, but it should be 
noted however that this particular disruption remains whichever remedy is applied, once 
there is no compliance with the ruling. The objective should then be to minimize the 
disruptions in the system. What retaliation does is to restrict trade to a certain level, 
whereas financial compensation could avoid this situation. In addition, monetary 
compensation does not distort bound trading obligations.
Appropriate apportioning of benefits and burden: Unlike the current system of 
compensation and retaliation, monetary compensation does not involve a wrong 
allocation of benefits and burden. In other words, there is no situation whereby one sector 
which did not have anything to do with the violation in the first place derives the benefits 
as per the current system of compensation; or where a sector which is not the subject of 
the dispute bears the burden as in the current form of retaliation. The proceeds from the 
compensation could then, if put to good use by the government, be used to ameliorate the 
losses suffered by the particular sector affected by the violation. Hence, the loser 




While there is much to be said about the WTO remedies, there remains much to be done 
particularly with respect to developing countries. In this paper, I have tried to show why 
the poorer Members of the WTO have not been making use of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. Also, I discussed why the present remedies are not sufficient to address all 
the problems that may arise as a result of one Member’s violation of its obligations, 
especially with regard to developing countries which lack retaliatory capacity.
It is in the light of these problems that financial compensation becomes a viable 
alternative dispute settlement remedy. In proposing financial compensation as a remedy, 
the following are my suggestions as to how it can be successfully negotiated, and the 
issues that have to be resolved before it can become a reality. These include: 
• Amendment of the DSU: To give it the force of law, the DSU needs to be 
amended to ensure that financial compensation is a recognized remedy available 
under all the covered agreements. The developing country group needs to ensure 
that financial compensation remains on the negotiating table. Since this present 
round of negotiating is a development round, there is a good chance that if they 
press their demands and are prepared to make some concessions, it could become 
a reality.
• Eligibility requirements: For starters, only LDCs or poor developing country 
Members  should be able to request financial compensation and they should only 
be able to request this against the developed countries and not against one 
another;
• Procedural issues: Since the primary dispute settlement remedy is withdrawal of 
the offensive measure, it is not up to the Panel/Appellate Body Members to order 
the payment of financial compensation. It is only where the violator has refused to 
comply with the ruling that the case for financial compensation is heard 
separately.
• Calculation of the compensation: Like in the case of retaliation, there should be an 
arbitral proceeding to determine the amount that should be paid as compensation. 
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the figure should be calculated based on the amount of lost trade as well as lost 
profits starting from the time when the violation began up until it is removed. A 
time limit should be provided for its payment i.e. until there is compliance with 
the DSB ruling. 
• Enforcement of the remedy: To ensure that a decision imposing financial 
compensation is followed, the use of bonds is worth exploring. Also, preventing a 
Member from using the dispute settlement mechanism where it has refused to pay 
financial compensation is likely to be an effective means of ensuring compliance.
Several points should be taken from the US Copyright case in future deliberations on 
financial compensation:117
• One, it shows that financial compensation under the WTO is possible. Even with 
all the objections which have been raised as to the possibility of using financial 
compensation, the fact that there is an example shows that there is a way of 
resolving whatever difficulties there might be in resolving financial 
compensation. 
• Two, it shows that there is a way to calculate financial compensation. In this case, 
an arbitration proceeding was set up to determine the level of nullification and 
impairment suffered by the EC as a result of the U.S legislation.118 It was this 
figure that was then used as the amount to be paid by the U.S. 
• Three, it shows that it is indeed not impossible that countries would be willing to 
pay compensation. At the time of this payment, compensation was voluntary and 
still the US opted to pay compensation while it was still in the process of bringing 
its law into conformity with its WTO obligation. 
• Four, it shows that compensation is a temporary measure that does not remove the 
obligation to remove the violation. It will be noticed that there was a time span for 
the payment of this compensation. It was expected that the dispute would still be 
resolved, and that the payment of compensation was a ‘mutually satisfactory 
117 See supra note 83.
118 US- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act- Award of the Arbitrator
(WT/DS160/ARB25/1).
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temporary arrangement’. Even if there were no resolution of the dispute, this 
problem would apply with all the other remedies. In any case, even retaliation is 
supposed to be a temporary measure until the violation is removed.119 Therefore, 
also financial compensation would remain in place until the violation is removed.
• Finally, it shows that payment of monetary compensation is not a breach of the 
MFN principle. Throughout the period while the negotiations were going on as to 
reaching a mutually satisfactory arrangement, Australia which was a third party in 
the proceeding kept on insisting that whatever solution was reached must be 
applied on an MFN basis. 120  While this would have been the case if the 
compensation was in the form of concessions, it did not hold where it became 
obvious that the compensation would be monetary. This goes to show that where 
financial compensation is the agreed remedy, MFN would not apply. It also 
supports the case that third parties are not entitled to financial compensation, or 
indeed to any remedy.121
In the end, whether or not financial compensation becomes a reality depends on whether 
makers of such statements as the following will pay more than lip service to their 
statements: “[t]he EU is also concerned by the difficulties that developing countries face 
in participating actively in the dispute settlement system. Within the framework of the 
negotiations on DSU, the EU is therefore in favour of initiatives aimed at granting to 
developing countries a better access to the system and providing them with the necessary 
training and technical assistance”.122
119 Art 22:8 DSU.
120 Australia’s position was that there ought to be a clarification of the provisions of the DSU to the 
effect that all compensation arrangements must be available to all Members on a non-discriminatory basis 
and that arbitration may be used to determine the appropriate level of nullification or impairment.
121 The exception is of course if the measure is withdrawn in which case the benefit 
is enjoyed generally, or where the compensation is not financial in which case it has to be 




Baffes, John “Cotton and Developing Countries: A Case Study in Policy Incoherence”
(2003) Trade Note 10 International Trade Department World Bank Group
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote10.pdf
Ballantine, Dewey “Comments Concerning Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the World Trade Organization” (1998) available at
<http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/wto_comments.pdf> 
Bhala, R. & Kennedy, K. (1998) World Trade Law: Lexis Law Publishing 
Bown Chad P. & Hoekman M. Bernard, “WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing 
Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector” (2005) 8 Journal of 
International Economic Law 861-890 
Bown, Chad P. “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested 
Parties, and Free Riders” available at 
<http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/free_ride.pdf > 
Bronckers, Marco & van den Broek, Naboth “Financial Compensation in the WTO: 
Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement” (2005) 8 Journal of International 
Economic Law 101-126
Davey, William J. “The WTO Dispute Settlement: How Have Developing Countries 
Fared?” (2005) 05-17 Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=862804
Gappah, Petina “African Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement System”
http://www.tralac.org/pdf/African_Countries_and_the_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_Syste
m.rtf
GATT Secretariat, (1994) The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, The Legal Texts: Geneva 
Hudec, Robert E. (1993) Enforcing International Trade Law- The Evolution of the 
Modern GATT Legal System: Butterworth Legal Publishers
Hudec, Robert E. “Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement”
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf
Limao, Nuno & Saggi, Kamal “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the 
Enforcement of International Trade Agreements” (2006) available at 
http://faculty.smu.edu/ksaggi/LIMAO-SAGGI.pdf
45
O’Connor, Bernard & Djordjevic, Margareta “Practical Aspects of Monetary 
Compensation: The US- Copyright Case” (2005) 8 Journal of International Economic 
Law 127
Pauwelyn, Joost “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-
Toward a More Collective Approach” (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law
335-347
Trachtman, Joel P. “Building the WTO Cathedral” (February 17 2006) Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=815844
Trebilcock, Michael J. & Howse, Robert (2005) The Regulation of International Trade 
3rd ed.: Routledge
WTO Agreements
Agreement on Implementation of Art VI GATT (Antidumping Agreement)
Agreement on Safeguards
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
WTO Dispute Settlement Cases
European Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-
(WT/DS285)
European Communities- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) -
Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 DSU (WT/DS285/AB/R)
European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 
(WT/DS27)
European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU-
(WT/DS27/ARB/ECU)
India- Antidumping Measure on Batteries from Bangladesh (WT/DS306)
46
Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; 
WT/DS11/AB/R)
United States- Reformulated Gasoline- Status Report by the United States (WT/DS2/10)
United States- Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services- Award of the Arbitrator (WT/DS285/13)
United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton Dispute (WT/DS267/AB/R)
United States- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act- Notification of a Mutually 
Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement (WT/DS160/23)
United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(WT/DS58/AB/R)
United States- Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act (WT/DS160)
WTO Documents
Doha Ministerial Declaration, November 14 2001 (WT/MIN01/DEC/1)
Draft Decision Concerning Specific Measures in Favour of Cotton with a view to Poverty 
Alleviation: Communication from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, 22 August 2003 
(WT/GC/W/511)
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement Dispute Settlement Proposal 10 October 1988
(MTN.GNG/NG13/W/30)
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement Communication from Nicaragua, 6 November 
1987 (Special Distribution MTN.GNG/NG13/W/15)
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement- Differential and more Favourable treatment of 
Developing Countries in the GATT Dispute Settlement System 30 June l988 (Special 
Distribution MTN.GNG/NGl3/W/27)
Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding- Proposal by the LDC Group 
(World Trade Organisation TN/DS/W/17)
Negotiations on Agriculture: Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in Favour of Cotton 
16 May 2003 (TN/AG/GEN/4 (03-2613))
Report by the Consultative Board to the Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi
World Trade Report (2003) “Trade and Development: The Doha Development Agenda”  
47
Websites
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/index_en.htm
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twe276b.htm
http://www.intracen.org/worldtradenet/docs/whatsnew/newsletters_2003/newslettervol4n
o6.pdf
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote10.pdf
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/urdsu.htm
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2484.html
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr03_chap2b_e.pdf
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#top
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=862804
http://www.gmfus.org/trade/event/detail.cfm?id=70&parent_type=E
http://www.tralac.org/pdf/African_Countries_and_the_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_Syste
m.rtf
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm
http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/wto_comments.pdf
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm
